A deniable authentication protocol enables the protocol participants to authenticate their respective peers, while able to deny their participation after the protocol execution. This protocol can be extremely useful in some practical applications such as online negotiation, online shopping and electronic voting. Recently, we have improved a deniable authentication scheme proposed by Chou et al. due to its vulnerability to the key compromise impersonation attack in our previous report. However, we have later discovered that our previous enhanced protocol is vulnerable to the insider key compromise impersonation attack and key replicating attack. In this paper, we will again secure this protocol against these attacks and demonstrate its heuristic security analysis.
Introduction
Privacy of communication has always been a major concern in various personal and business communications. This has in fact motivated the research and development of Deniable Authentication in cryptography field for centuries. With proper deniable authentication, the legal parties are able to authenticate their peers via exchanging messages over an insecure communication channel, and at the same time, the message receiver would not be able to convince a third party (may or may not be the adversary) on the identity of the sender even if the receiver reveal his own long-lived private key to the third party. Hence, the common association of digital signature with message authentication in the public key scenario is often undesirable since only at most weak deniability [16] (the receiver can prove to have spoken with the sender but not the content of what the sender authenticated) can be guaranteed in this case.
Over the years, numerous deniable authentication protocols have been proposed. However, due to the rush in exploiting new ideas which results in careless design, many of them have been proven to be vulnerable to a variety of cryptanalytic attacks [4, 8, 9, 15, 21] . The notion of deniability in public key authentication is pioneered by Dwork et al. [11] , which is based on the concurrent zero knowledge proof. However, this scheme requires a timing constraint and the proof of knowledge is time-consuming. In 2003, Boyd, Mao and Paterson [5] have proposed 2 deniable authenticated key establishment schemes for Internet protocols based on elliptic curve cryptography. These schemes are conjectured to be able to solute the complexity of computation and appear to be more efficient than others. However, Chou et al. [9] have proved their security flaw by demonstrating a valid key compromise impersonation (KCI) attack on their scheme in 2005. Another notable deniable authentication scheme which was proposed by Fan et al. [12] in 2002 is based on Diffie-Hellman key distribution protocol. Unfortunately, Yoon et al. [21] have pointed out the susceptibility of Fan et al.'s scheme to the intruder masquerading attack in 2005 and subsequently, they have proposed their enhanced deniable authentication protocol. In addition, in 2005, Cao et al. [7] have proposed an efficient ID-based deniable authentication protocol which enables a dynamic shared secret to be derived as a session key. Unfortunately, in 2006, both Yoon et al.'s enhanced scheme and Cao et al.'s scheme were proven to be impractical and susceptible to KCI attack respectively by Chou et al. [8] . Moreover, Chou et al. have proposed another new deniable authentication protocol and they have conjectured their proposed protocol to possess strong deniability as well as authenticity with great resistance against KCI attack. Recently, we have proven them wrong by launching a valid KCI attack on their scheme and subsequently proposed our improved scheme in [15] . However, we have spotted a few security flaws in our previous improvement [15] that might results in some further undesirable cryptanalytic attacks. Hence, we aim to address them thoroughly by proposing our latest improvements in this paper.
The structure of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we will illustrate some basic properties of bilinear pairings and underlying assumptions. In Section 3, we will review Chou et al.'s ID-based deniable authentication protocol and our previous improvement. In Section 4, we will demonstrate the security flaws lying in our previous improved scheme. In Section 5, we will illustrate our latest improved scheme and its associated security analysis. Last but not least, we will conclude this paper in Section 6.
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the basic properties of bilinear pairings, the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem and the Discrete Logarithm Problem. Let G 1 be an additive group of a large prime order, q and G 2 be a multiplicative group of the same order, q. Let P, Q ∈ G 1 andê :
be a bilinear pairing with the following properties:
• Non-degeneracy:ê(P, Q) = 1.
• Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to computeê(P, Q).
A bilinear map which satisfies all three properties above is considered as admissible bilinear. It is noted that the Weil and Tate pairings associated with the supersingular elliptic curves or abelian varieties, can be modified to create such bilinear maps. Now, we describe some cryptographic problems:
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP). Let G 1 , G 2 , P andê be as above with the order q being prime. Given P, aP, bP, cP with a, b, c ∈ Z * q , computê e(P, P ) abc ∈ G 2 . An algorithm α is deemed to have an advantage in solving the BDHP in G 1 , G 2 ,ê based on the random choices of a, b, c in Z * q and the internal random operation of α if
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP). Given two groups of elements P and Q, such that Q = nP . Find the integer n whenever such an integer exists.
Throughout this paper, we assume that BDHP is intractable, which means that there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve BDHP and DLP with non-negligible probability.
Review of Chou et al.'s ID-based Deniable Authentication Protocol and its variant
In this section, we look at a specific ID-based deniable authentication protocol proposed by Chou, Chen and Huang [8] and subsequently our previous improvement [15] .
Chou et al.'s Scheme
As usual, we specify the two communication parties in a protocol run as Alice and Bob. Now suppose that they wish to communicate with each other. To achieve this, they perform an instance of the protocol run. Initially, the Private Key Generator (PKG) picks a master private key s ∈ Z * q and sets the master public key
The PKG then publishes
is a security parameter) and H 3 : {0, 1} * −→ {0, 1} * are one-way collision-free cryptographic hash functions. For a given string ID ∈ {0, 1} * , the PKG computes the public key,
and the private key,
Hence, Alice and Bob's public/private key pairs are denoted as Q A /S A and Q B /S B respectively. We describe Chou et al.'s protocol as follows:
Step 1. Alice chooses a random number, r A ∈ Z * q , computes
and then sends (ID A , u) to Bob.
Step 2. Upon receipt of (ID A , u), Bob chooses a random number, r B ∈ Z * q and calculates
and sends (ID B , f ) to Alice.
Step 3. After receiving (ID B , f ), Alice computes
and subsequently computes the session key,
Suppose that m A is the message which Alice's would like to send together with her ID. She computes
and sends (g A , m A ) to Bob.
Step 4. After receiving (g A , m A ), Bob calculates
, where x B =ê(r B S B , P ), (13)
, where y B =ê(r B Q A , P pub ). (14) Then, he computes the session key
Finally, Bob computes
and compares whether
If it does (does not), Bob accepts (rejects) the session key.
The authors claimed their scheme to be deniable, authenticated and resilient against the KCI attack as shown in their heuristic security analysis [8] . However, we had proved the opposite in [15] .
The Key Compromise Impersonation Attack and Our Previous Improvement
The KCI attack can be informally defined as a kind of known-key attack, which can be carried out by an adversary after compromising a protocol entity's private key. We often refer such entity as corrupted. An entity can be corrupted easily in many real-world scenarios. For example, a malicious party may hack into or "hijack" the entity's computer or machine in order to learn the entity's private key. Even worse, the corrupted party may not even aware of this intrusion and this significantly benefits the adversary in utilizing the corrupted party's private key in his bad deeds, at least until the corrupted entity has detected this compromisation. However, instead of impersonating the corrupted party directly, the general adversarial goal in the KCI attack is to masquerade as any other legitimate party and engage with the corrupted party in a session by means of establishing a valid session key with him. With this, the adversary may appear to be an "authentic" bank officer to the corrupted party and subsequently capture some valuable information from him (e.g. credit card number or bank account password). If the adversary is able to do so, we can then intuitively speculate the protocol to be susceptible to the KCI attack.
As shown in our previous report [15] , the security of Chou et al.'s scheme can be breached by imposing such KCI attack on their scheme. In the attack, a malicious adversary is capable of impersonating the sender (Alice) and completing a specific protocol run with the receiver (Bob) if the receiver's private key has been exposed by some means. Due to the bilinear property of pairing, it should be easily noted that by learning the value of S B in prior, h A in Step 3. can be calculated by using Eq. (5) and the subsequent parameters (r B , X A , Y A (using Eq. (14)), K A (using Eq. (15)) and g A ) can be derived accordingly.
In order to defeat this attack, we suggested an improved scheme in [15] with the intention to prevent the adversary's ability in computing h B if S B happens to be compromised. Now, we describe the improved protocol as follows:
Step 1. Similar to the original protocol, Alice chooses a random number, r A ∈ Z * q , computes u from Eq. (4) and sends (ID A , u) to Bob.
Step 2. After receiving (ID A , u), Bob chooses a random number, r B ∈ Z * q * and computes
and f from Eq. (6), and sends (ID B , f, v) to Alice.
Step 3. Upon receipt of (ID B , f, v), Alice computes
and r B from Eq. (8). Then, she calculates X A , Y A , and the session key K A from Eqs. (9), (10) and (11) respectively. Eventually, she computes g A from Eq. (12) and sends (g A , m A ) to Bob.
Step 4. After receiving (g A , m A ), Bob calculates X B , Y B and the session key K B from Eqs. (13), (14) and (15) With this improvement, our previous work seems to be secure as it is immune to the KCI attack now. However, we discover that this improvement is strongly deficient as it in turns results in another two flaws which we will describe in the next section.
Flaws in the Previous Improved Scheme

Insider KCI Attack
The adversary in the KCI attack that we discussed so far is preceived as an outsider. What if the KCI attacker is an insider? It should be noted that malicious insiders may exist as the number of protocol principals grows. In order to secure a protocol against the KCI attack, we stress that the existence of such malicious insiders should be regarded as important as outsider adversaries in the KCI analysis. For instance, the presence of a malicious bank user impersonating the bank officer to cheat another corrupted bank user, after obtaining the corrupted user's secret key.
How would our previous work be affected if the adversary is an insider? To answer this, we provide an analysis on our previous improved scheme in detail by considering the KCI adversary to be an insider. As usual, we designate the two communicating parties as Alice and Bob, and the insider adversary as Eve (with his public/private key pair as Q E /S E ). Assume that Bob's private key S B has been compromised in prior. With the intention to impersonate Alice, Eve is now more powerful since she can exploit the advantage of possessing both his private key and Bob's private key in mounting the attack. To cheat Bob, Eve initially initiates an instance of the protocol run where we assume that Alice does not know anything about this. The attack algorithm can be described as follows:
Step 1. Impersonating Alice, Eve chooses a random number, r E ∈ Z * q , computes
and sends (ID A , u ) to Bob. Since Bob does not know r E due to intractability of DLP, he would not be able to distinguish whether u is really originated from Alice.
Step 2. After receiving (ID A , u ), Bob follows the protocol procedures in Section 3.2 as usual. He chooses a random number, r B ∈ Z * q * and computes v from Eq. (18), h B (by using u instead of u) from Eq. (19) and f from Eq. (6), and sends (ID B , f, v) to Alice.
Step 3. Before reaching Alice, Eve intercepts (ID B , f, v), and computes
and subsequently extracts r B from Eq. (8) . Note that h A and h B are consistent:
Then, she calculates X A , Y A , and the session key K A from Eqs. (9), (14) and (15) respectively. At last, she computes g A from Eq. (12) and sends (g A , m A ) to Bob.
Step 4. After receiving (g A , m A ), Bob calculates X B , Y B and the session key K B from Eqs. (13), (14) and (15) respectively. At last, he computes g B from Eq. (16) and he would find that Eq. (17) eventually holds.
As a result, we have shown that the security of the previous improved scheme can be penetrated by the insider KCI attack. Since Bob would accept the session key at the end by falsely authenticating the sender's identity, our previous improvement scheme is therefore insecure.
Key Replicating Attack
A further cryptanalytic attack can be carried out on our previous improved scheme, namely the key replicating attack [4, 13] , in which it deals closely with the oracle queries described in Bellare and Rogaway's formal model [1, 2] . This attack, if successfully carried out, would enable the adversary to succeed in forcing the establishment of a session, S (other than the Test session or its matching session) to possess the same session key as the Test session. Since the Test session and S are non-matching, the adversary may issue a Reveal query to the oracle associated with S and he can then distinguish whether the Test session key is real or random. Now let us scrutinize our previous improved scheme with such a key replicating attack. Similarly, we assume Alice and Bob are the communicating parties and Eve remains to be the active adversary, who has full control over the unauthenticated communication channel.
Step 1. Initially, Alice chooses a random number, r A ∈ Z * q , computes u from Eq. (4) and sends (ID A , u) to Bob.
Step 2. Before reaching Bob, Eve intercepts the message.
She chooses a random number x ∈ Z * q and fabricates
After that, Eve sends (ID A , u ) to Bob on behalf of Alice. Upon receiving the altered message, without suspicion, Bob chooses a random number, r B ∈ Z * q * and computes v from Eq. (18), h B (by using u instead of u) from Eq. (19) and f from Eq. (6), and sends (ID B , f, v) to Alice.
Step 3. Before reaching Alice, Eve intercepts (ID B , f, v) , fabricates
and sends (ID B , f, v ) to Alice. Alice computes h A by using v and extract r B from f subsequently without being aware of the modified value of v. Then, she calculates X A , Y A , and the session key K A from Eqs. (9), (10) and (11) respectively. Eventually, she computes g A from Eq. (12) and sends (g A , m A ) to Bob.
Notice that in this scenario, although both Alice and Bob have non-matching conversation at the end of the protocol execution, they have accepted the same session key, that is
Hence, after the protocol execution, Eve is allowed to expose a fresh session key by revealing either Alive or Bob in his attack and he would be able to guess correctly on the genuineness of the Test-session key for the other nonmatching session (either Bob or Alice's).
Enhancement and Security Analysis
As discussed in the previous session, our previous improved scheme contains flaws which would pose a serious and subtle threat to the protocol participants, despite possessing the attractive deniability property. In order to address the defects, we generally base our proposed solutions on two approaches:
1. Restrict the parameters u(= r A ·Q A ) and v(= r B ·Q B )
in this protocol to be computed by using the intended public keys (to defeat the insider KCI attack), and any alteration to such parameters should be detected through subsequent verfication by the respective communicating partner.
2. Use a key derivation function to derive the session key (K A and K B ). Other than the shared secret as shown in Eqs. (11) as well as (15), the inclusion of the unique session identifiers into the key derivation function should be treated equally essential especially in preventing a variety of undesirable cryptographic attacks, such as key replicating attack and triangle attack [6] .
With this, we propose our enhanced scheme as follows:
Step 1. Initially, Alice picks a random number, r A ∈ Z * q , computes u from Eq. (4) and
and then sends (ID A , u, w) to Bob.
Step 2. Upon receiving Alice's message, Bob checks whetherê (w, u) 
Alice terminates the session if the verification fails. Otherwise, she calculates X A from Eq. (9), Y A from Eq. (10), and the session key
Eventually, she computes g A from Eq. (12) and sends (g A , m A ) to Bob.
Step 4. After receiving (g A , m A ), Bob calculates X B from Eq. (13), Y B from Eq. (14) and the session key Lemma 2. Our improved protocol is able to withstand the key replicating attack, where the protocol participants would agree on a different session key if their conversation is non-matching.
As shown in the protocol above, the session key is derived by a key deriving function which takes in the shared secret and the messages recorded in the transcript as the session identifiers. If Eve carry out the key replicating attack in Section 4.2, Alice's session key K A = kdf (ê(S A , Q B )
XAYA r A Q A r A P h B ⊕ r B x · r B Q B ) would be different from Bob's session key K B = kdf (ê(Q A , S B ) XB YB x·r A Q A r A P h B ⊕r B r B Q B ) at the end of the protocol execution. With this, Eve would not be able to force the establishment of non matching sessions to possess a same session key. As a result, she would end up guessing the genuineness of Test-session key on her luck. Lemma 3. Our improved protocol remains deniable.
Our improved protocol enables both Alice and Bob to simulate the transcripts perfectly. As the messages are properly authenticated during the protocol execution, both parties are in fact aware of the identity of their respective partner. However, since Alice and Bob are holding the same session key at the end of the protocol execution, Bob would not be able to prove to a third party that (h, m) is originated from Alice since Alice can later deny her participation by claiming that such message can also be simulated by Bob.
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